Morgan to Greene, re: Cowpens (Part 1)

General Morgan to General Greene–
Report on the Battle of Cowpens
Camp on Cain Creek on Pedee
January 19th, 1781.

Dear Sir–The troops I have the honor to command have gained a complete victory over a detachment from the British Army commanded by Lieut.-Col. Tarleton. It happened on the 17th inst., about sunrise, at a place called the Cowpens, near Pacolet River. On the 14th, having received intelligence that the British Army were in motion, and that their movements clearly indicated the intention of dislodging me, I abandoned my encampment at Glendale Ford, and on the 16th, in the evening, took possession of a post about seven miles from Chroke on Broad River. My former position subjected me at once to the operations of Lord Cornwallis and Colonel Tarleton, and in case of a defeat my retreat might easily have been cut off. My situation at Cowpens enabled me to improve any advantage that I might gain and to provide better for my security should I be unfortunate. These reasons induced me to take this post, notwithstanding it had the appearance of a retreat. On the evening of the 16th, the enemy occupied the ground we had removed from in the morning. One hour before daylight one of my scouts informed me that they had advanced within five miles of our camp. On this information the necessary dispositions were made. From the activity of the troops we were soon prepared to receive them. The light infantry commanded by Lt.-Col. Howard, and the Virginia Militia under Major Triplett, were formed on a rising ground. The Third Regiment of Dragoons, consisting of about 80 men, under command of Lt. Col. Washington, were so posted in the rear as not to be injured by the enemy's fire, and yet to be able to charge them should an occasion offer; the Volunteers from North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia under the command of Col. Pickens were posted to guard the flanks. Major McDowal, of the North Carolina Volunteers, were posted on the right flank in front of the line 150 yards. Major Cunningham, of the Georgia Volunteers, on the left, at the same distance in front, Colonels Brannon and Thomas, of the South Carolina Volunteers, on the right of Major McDowal, and Colonels Hays and McCall of the same corps to the left of Major Cunningham. Capts. Tate and Buchanan, with the Augusta Riflemen, were to support the right of the line. The enemy drew up in one line four hundred yards in front of our advanced corps. The first battalion of the 71st Regiment was opposed to our right, the 7th to our left, the Legion Infantry to our centre, and two companies of the light troops, 100 each, on our flanks. In their front they moved two pieces of artillery, and Lieut.-Col. Tarleton, with 280 cavalry, was posted in the rear of the line. The disposition being thus made, small parties of riflemen were detached to skirmish with the enemy, on which the whole line advanced with the greatest impetuosity, shouting as they advanced. Majors McDowal and Cunningham gave them a heavy and galling fire, and retreated to the regiments intended for their support; the whole of Col. Pickens' command then kept up a fire by regiments, retreating agreeable to orders. When the enemy advanced on our lines they received a well directed and incessant fire, but their numbers being superior to ours they gained our flanks, which obliged us to change our position. We retired, in good order, about fifty paces, formed and advanced on the enemy and gave them a brisk fire, which threw them into disorder. Lieut.-Col. Howard observing this gave orders for the line to charge bayonets, which was done with such address that the enemy fled with the utmost precipitation. Lieut.-Col. Washington discovering that the cavalry were cutting down our riflemen on the left, charged them with such firmness as obliged them to retire in confusion. The enemy were entirely routed, and the pursuit continued upwards of twenty miles. Our loss was inconsiderable, not having more than twelve killed and sixty wounded. The enemy's loss was to commissioned officers and over 100 rank and file killed and 200 wounded, 29 commissioned officers and about 500 privates prisoners which fell into our hands with two pieces of artillery, two standards, 800 muskets, one travelling forge, thirty-five baggage wagons, seventy negroes and upwards of 100 dragoon horses, with all their musick. They destroyed most of the baggage which was immense. Although our success was complete we fought only 800 men and were opposed by upwards of one thousand chosen British Troops. Such was the inferiority of our numbers that our success must be attributed, under God, to the justice of our cause and the bravery of our Troops. My wishes would induce me to mention the name of every private centinel in the Corps. In justice to the brave and good conduct of the officers, I have taken the liberty to enclose you a list of their names from a conviction that you will be pleased to introduce such characters to the world. Major Giles, my aid de camp, and Captain Brooks, acting as Brigade Major, deserves to have my thanks for their assistance and behavior on this occasion. The Baron de Glabuck, who accompanies Major Giles with these despatches, behaved in such manner as to merit your attention.

I am sir, Your obedient servant,

DAN MORGAN

Blackstock's, According to Tarleton

From Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton's, A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, in the Southern Provinces of North America, 1787:

On the evening of the 18th, Tarleton obtained information, that General Sumter, with upwards of one thousand men, was moving towards Williams' house, a post occupied by friendly militia, fifteen miles from Ninety Six.At daybreak next morning the light troops directed their course for Indian Creek, marched all day with great diligence, and encamped at night, with secrecy and precaution, near the Enoree River.
Another day's movement was intended up the banks of that river, which, if completed without discovery, would, perhaps, give an opportunity of destroying General Sumter's corps by surprise; or certainly would prevent his accomplishing a retreat without the risk of an action.
This encouraging hope was frustrated in the evening by the desertion of a soldier of the 63rd, and the American commander at twelve o'clock at night obtained intelligence of his danger.
Tarleton pursued his march at dawn, and before ten o'clock in the morning had information of the retreat of General Sumter:
He continued his route to a ford upon the Enoree, where he expected to gain farther intelligence, or perhaps meet the Americans.
On his arrival near that place, he found that the advanced guard and main body of the enemy had passed the river near two hours, and, that a detachment to cover the rear was waiting the return of a patrole:
The advanced guard of the British dragoons charged this body, and defeated them with considerable slaughter.
From prisoners it was learned, that the sudden movement of the Americans was owing to the treachery of the deserter, by whose information General Sumter had fortunately escaped an unexpected attack, and had now the option to fight or retire.
Though greatly superior in number, he did not wait the approach of the British, but by a rapid march endeavoured to cross the rivers in his rear; beyond which, if pressed to extremity, he could disband his followers in the woods, and without great detriment assemble them again at an appointed quarter to the northward of the Pacolet River.
The march already made by the British infantry, he imagined must soon render them unable to keep up with the cavalry; which circumstance, he flattered himself, would impede the advance of Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, or, at the worst, produce only a partial engagement.
Influenced by such reflections, he continued an indefatigable march, which was followed without intermission by the British.
Tarleton, unwilling to divide his corps, and risk an action against a great superiority with his dragoons and the 63rd, pressed forward his light and legion infantry, and three pounder, in a compact body, till four o'clock in the afternoon; at which time it became evident, that the enemy would have an opportunity of passing unmolested the Tyger River before dark, if he did not alter his disposition:
He therefore left his legion and light infantry, who had made meritorious exertions during the whole day, to march on at their own pace, whilst he made a rapid pursuit with one hundred and seventy cavalry of the legion, and eighty mounted men of the 63rd.
Before five o'clock the advanced guard charged a detachment of the Americans, who gave ground after some loss, and retreated to the main body.
Sumter now discovered, that he could not with safety immediately attempt to pass the Tyger, and that the ground which he possessed on its banks gave him a favourable opportunity to resist the efforts of the cavalry.
Regular information of his being pressed at this period by the mounted part of Tarleton's corps had been communicated to him; which, without such report, he might have calculated by the distance and duration of the movement:
A woman on horseback had viewed the line of march from a wood, and, by a nearer road, had given intelligence that the British were approaching without infantry or cannon.
Decide by these considerations, the American commander prepared for action, and made a judicious disposition of his force:
He posted the center of his troops in some houses and out-houses, composed of logs, and situated on the middle of an eminence; he extended his right along some rails, which were flanked by an inaccessible mountain; and he distributed his left on a rugged piece of ground that was covered by a bend of the river; a small branch of water ran in front of the whole rising ground, which was called Blackstock's Hill:
The great road to the ford across the river passed through the center of the Americans, and close to the doors of houses where the main body were stationed.
The whole position was visible, owing to the elevation of the ground, and this formidable appearance made Tarleton halt upon the opposite height, where he intended to remain quiet till his infantry and three pounder arrived:
To encourage the enemy to do the same, he dismounted the 63rd to take post, and part of the cavalry to ease their horses.
Sumpter observing this operation, ordered a body of four hundred Americans to advance, and attack the 63rd in front, whilst another party approached the dragoons in flank.
A heavy fire and sharp conflict ensued: The 63d charged with fixed bayonets, and drove the enemy back; and a troop of cavalry, under Lieutenant Skinner, bravely repulsed the detachment which threatened the flank.
The ardour of the 63rd carried them too far, and exposed them to a considerable fire from the buildings and the mountain.
Though the undertaking appeared hazardous, Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton determined to charge the enemy's center with a column of dragoons, in order to cover the 63rd, whose situation was now become dangerous.
The attack was conducted with great celerity, and was attended with immediate success.
The cavalry soon reached the houses, and broke the Americans, who from that instant began to disperse: The 63rd immediately rallied, and darkness put an end to the engagement.
A pursuit across a river, with a few troops of cavalry, and a small body of infantry, was not advisable in the night; a position was therefore taken adjoining to the field of battle, to wait the arrival of the light and legion infantry.
An express was sent to acquaint Earl Cornwallis with the success of his troops, and patroles were dispatched over the river at dawn, to discover if any part of the enemy remained in a body:
Intelligence was soon brought across the Tyger, that the corps was entirely dispersed, except a party of one hundred, who remained in a compact state, in order to escort General Sumpter, who was wounded in the action.
This news, and some rumours of approaching reinforcements, impelled Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton to follow the late advantage, by pursuing the fugitives; which would prevent their rallying to assist their friends, if the report was true concerning their advance.
Accordingly, leaving a guard to protect the wounded, he again commenced his march:
The men who had remained with their general since his misfortune, upon hearing of the approach of the British, placed him in a litter between two horses, and dispersed through the woods.
After a toilsome pursuit of three days, in which a few stragglers were secured, intelligence was obtained that General Sumpter had been conducted across the country by five faithful adherents, till he was removed out of danger.
Three of the enemy's colonels fell in the action, and General Sumter received a severe wound in the shoulder. Upwards of one hundred Americans were killed and wounded, and fifty were made prisoners.
On the side of the British, Lieutenants Gibson and Cope, of the 63rd, were killed; and Lieutenant Money, aide-de-camp to Earl Cornwallis, who had commanded the detachment of mounted infantry, with great gallantry, was mortally wounded:
Another officer of the 63rd, and two subalterns of the British legion, were likewise wounded. The former corps had also thirty, and the latter fifteen, non-commissioned officers and men, with thirty horses, killed and wounded.
General Sumter made proper use of the good fortune which had manifested itself in his favour previous to the action; and if he had waited in his strong position at Blackstock's till dark, without advancing a corps to attack the 63rd, and the cavalry, he might have withdrawn, in all probability, without his adversaries' knowledge.
But, he would have been completely protected in the operation, even if they had notice of his intention; owing to the superiority of his numbers, and the advantages he derived from the situation of the ground, and the river; which could not be approached, after dark, by the British, till the light and legion infantry arrived; previous to which event, the rear guard of the Americans might certainly have passed the Tyger.
The light troops made very great exertions, to bring General Sumter to action, and the hazard incurred by the cavalry, and 63rd, was compensated by the complete dispersion of the enemy.

The Call for the Overmountain Men

From King's Mountain and Its Heroes, by Lyman Copeland Draper, pub. 1881, P.G. Thomson, page 84:

"When Colonel [Charles] McDowell became convinced that Ferguson's movement to the north-western portion of South Carolina, threatened the invasion of the North Province also, he not only promptly raised what force he could from the sparsely populated settlements, on the heads of Catawba, Broad and Pacolet rivers, to take post in the enemy's front and watch his operations; but dispatched a messenger with this alarming intelligence to Colonels John Sevier and Isaac Shelby, on Watauga and Holston, those over-mountain regions, then a portion of North Carolina, but now of East Tennessee; urging those noted border leaders to bring to his aid all the riflemen they could, and as soon as possible.
Sevier, unable to leave his frontier exposed to the inroads of the Cherokees, responded at once to the appeal, by sending a part of his regiment under Major Charles Robertson; and Shelby, being more remote, and having been absent on a surveying tour, was a few days later, but joined McDowell, at the head of two hundred mounted riflemen, about the twenty-fifth of July, at his camp near the Cherokee Ford of Broad river."